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Executive Summary
Although Medicaid work requirements are currently halted in both Arkansas and
Kentucky, this analysis utilizes the data available to make an assessment and estimate of what
Kentucky’s Medicaid enrollment will look like if work requirements similar to those Arkansas
had are ever implemented. The relative severity of the administrative burden of such
requirements provide a tool for comparison, and a difference-in-differences analysis of the
change in Medicaid enrollment between Arkansas and West Virginia, a state that has not
implemented and currently has no plans to implement Medicaid work requirements, provide the
bases for this estimate. After coding the work requirements of Kentucky and Arkansas, and
ranking each on a 1-5 scoring scale, 1 being least severe and 5 being the most, I use total
enrollment data for Arkansas, Kentucky, and West Virginia, and I estimate the difference-indifferences of the percent of those enrolled divided by the state’s annual population between
West Virginia, my control state, and Arkansas, my treatment state. After standardizing and then
comparing Arkansas to West Virginia through difference-in-difference testing, I find a net drop
in enrollment with substantial uncertainty associated with it, leading to the conclusion in the first
step of this analysis showing that while Arkansas has more of a decrease post-treatment in
Medicaid enrollment than West Virginia, much of it is likely due to other factors.
These states’ trends are similar enough to provide an effective comparison for Kentucky,
however. I found that if Kentucky ever implements work requirements, the change due to work
requirements alone will be a decrease in enrollment by 24,129 people, over and above the
existing trend. The estimation of Kentucky with work requirements is based on the difference-indifferences estimation between Arkansas and West Virginia subtracted from Medicaid
enrollment annual population in Kentucky from June 2018 to December of 2018. This analysis
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provides an estimation of what could happen to total Medicaid enrollment in Kentucky, and
possibly other states, if work and community engagement requirements are implemented. Future
studies will hopefully have more data available in order to construct a more valid study of the
actual effect of work requirements in states that have implemented them in comparison with
those that have not and do not plan to – in order to inform the states that plan to what will happen
to their Medicaid enrollment. Future studies that ask this same or a similar research question
should also take into account other factors affecting Medicaid enrollment to provide a better
basis for their estimation in order to predict their effect on the state(s) in question.
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Introduction
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), colloquially known as
Obamacare or the ACA, signed into law by President Obama in 2010, mandated that states could
use federal funds to expand their Medicaid programs to include “adults up to 138 percent of the
poverty level” (MACPAC, 2019). While this mandate was originally a requirement under the
law, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court found this
requirement unconstitutional in that Congress could not use its spending power in this way,
making Medicaid expansion optional (MACPAC, 2019). Since this decision in June of 2012,
states have followed different paths to coverage expansion, taking advantage of provisions in
Section 1115 of the Social Security Act that allow for research and demonstration waivers. As of
March 15, 2019, eight states applying for Medicaid expansion were granted approval for their
Section 1115 waivers, and they include work requirements for beneficiaries. Further, six of the
waivers out of the total of eighteen (across seventeen states) that were pending as of April 6,
2019 (and waiting to receive approval or rejection with comments from the Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services (CMS)) were waivers with work requirements (Kaiser Family Foundation,
2019). Two of these states, Arkansas and Kentucky, were granted federal authority from CMS to
implement “work and community engagement requirements” (MACPAC, 2018b). CMS also
“issued subregulatory guidance” for states that decide to implement similar requirements in the
future (MACPAC, 2018b).
A federal district court blocked Kentucky’s waiver for work requirements in June of 2018
stating that “at minimum, the Secretary [of the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS)] failed to ‘adequately analyze’ coverage” when approving Kentucky’s waiver. According
to presiding Judge Boasberg, this failure to analyze impacts of work requirements left questions

6
concerning the potential loss of coverage among current Medicaid recipients and the promotion
of Medicaid as a source of coverage for potential beneficiaries (Galewitz, 2018). After this court
ruling, the waiver was edited and resubmitted, gaining approval from the Trump Administration,
but not officially implemented (Yetter, 2019). Instead, Kentucky faced a court challenge. On
March 27, 2019, the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia blocked both Kentucky’s
and Arkansas’s work requirements in Charles Gresham et al., v. Alex M. Azar II, et al. (2019). In
his decision, the judge cited parts of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), the Administrative Procedure Act, and
case precedent from FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc, 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009). On April 10,
2019, the Trump Administration appealed this decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit (Cheves, 2019). This new development will be expanded upon
further, with the analysis in this paper exploring the possibility that this court ruling will be
overturned, or that the waivers will eventually be approved after states make enough changes to
their plans to satisfy a court (Goodnough, 2019).
While Medicaid work requirements are considered a fairly new policy option, they have
been a central piece of the Trump Administration’s health care policy platform since the
inauguration. Kentucky and Arkansas, for example, both define work requirements as the
following. If an individual who is eligible for Medicaid meets certain criteria and is not exempt
from the program for certain allowable reasons, the individual must complete and report to their
state’s Medicaid office 80 hours of specific types of either “community engagement activities”
or employment per month; failure to do so results in forfeiture of Medicaid benefits until such
time the state allows the individual to re-apply to the program. The reasoning often cited to
justify federal support for and state implementation of such programs is that work requirements
encourage labor force participation and, therefore, economic growth. Supporters also state that
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government provision of healthcare can be warranted or further supported when the contributions
of an increasing number of Medicaid-eligible Americans, who are able to work, volunteer, or
further their education begin doing so at an adequate rate (Sanger-Katz, 2018).
Others argue that these work requirements (and other methods in which the federal
government has delegated power to the states regarding Medicaid) are enacted in lieu of failed
efforts to repeal or stop the Medicaid expansion program provided to states through the ACA
(Solomon, 2018). Still one more argument for these policies is that some of the able-bodied
persons who are “taking advantage” of government insurance will go back to the private
insurance market in the face of work requirements and the related administrative burden that
must be overcome to complete them. The beneficiaries in this scenario may not want or be able
to fully complete these administrative obstacles (Solomon, 2018).
Section 1115 of the Social Security Act allows for “demonstration projects” in which
new and experimental policies can be proposed by states. In order to gain approval from the
federal government, these policies must meet certain requirements, and must, according to
Section 1115 guidelines, be “likely to assist in promoting the objectives of [Medicaid]” and
“show that a proposed demonstration project will increase and strengthen coverage, increase
health care access, improve health outcomes, or increase the efficiency and quality of care for
Medicaid beneficiaries and other low-income populations” (Solomon, 2018). Before the Trump
Administration took office, none of the states hoping to implement their own demonstration
projects through Medicaid expansion could meet the requirement of proof necessary—that their
project would increase or strengthen coverage, health outcomes, efficiency, or quality of care
(Solomon, 2018). These proposals were then not approved by the Obama Administration, on the
grounds that HHS found these policies “would have the effect of reducing enrollment” and “that
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these policies did not advance Medicaid’s objectives” (Greenwald and Solomon, 2018). In Utah,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Wisconsin, Arkansas, and New Hampshire, the proposals delineated
that “Medicaid eligibility” would be based on “work and work-related activities” and in Utah,
Maine, and Wisconsin, time limits were even imposed on how long people could be enrolled in
Medicaid (Solomon, 2018).
Under the Trump Administration however, CMS created new policy guidance and
objectives, making different connections to the usefulness of work requirements and presenting
new rationales for why they work. Administrative burden, a concept concisely defined by
Moynihan, Herd, and Harvey as “an individual’s experience of policy implementation as
onerous” plays a further role in the rationale behind these work requirements, as well as provides
a framework for classifying certain aspects of these work requirements and will be used as such
in this paper.
Many of the aforementioned states’ proposals were, at least initially, approved through
these new administrative policies under CMS once the Trump Administration took office. Two
of these states that received approval, Kentucky and Arkansas, are studied herein. The primary
research question is: What effect did the administrative burden of Arkansas’s work and
community engagement requirement program have on Medicaid enrollment and dropout rates,
and how can this estimate the results of Kentucky’s Medicaid waiver and its own work
requirements?

Literature Review and Hypothesis
Under the Trump Administration, states were invited to change Medicaid eligibility
requirements and add work requirements (Englehard, 2018). Kentucky was the first state to alter
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its Medicaid waivers in this manner and receive this approval. Arkansas, which received
approval shortly after Kentucky, was the first state to implement them because Kentucky’s work
requirements were challenged in court. Currently, almost half of all states are either considering
or actively pursuing approval for work requirements in Medicaid (Englehard, 2018).
The rationale that CMS uses to support the legality of work requirements in expansion
proposals is, in summary, that there is a connection of employment to the aforementioned
outcomes, and that these programs have increased overall employment, participation in job
training, and general increase in earned income for those that leave the Medicaid program for
“commercial coverage and self-sufficiency,” thereby decreasing reliance on the government’s
public programs (MACPAC, 2018b). Further, in Section 1115 of the regulations for similar,
future state expansion endeavors, CMS states that these requirements “promote upward mobility,
greater independence, and improved quality of life among individuals” (MACPAC, 2018b).
Those that oppose these proposals are concerned about the “potential harms to beneficiaries,”
and bring up the fact that many Medicaid beneficiaries are already working (MACPAC, 2018b).
These waiver programs are closely linked to the agenda of the Trump Administration. In
March 2017, Human Services Secretary Tom Price and CMS administrator Seema Verma sent a
letter to the governors of the United States informing them of the Trump Administration’s views
regarding the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion proposal, calling it “a clear departure
from the core, historical mission of the program” and stating that the rigid nature of the Medicaid
expansion rules under the ACA, prior to the Trump Administration and its own vision for
allowing states more freedom and options to expand, “provided states with an incentive to
deprioritize the most vulnerable populations” (Price and Verma, 2017). This precedes the
perceived purpose of the letter, which was to announce their support for methods such as work
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requirements, stating “It is our intent to use existing Section 1115 demonstration authority to
review and approve meritorious innovations that build on the human dignity that comes with
training, employment and independence” (Price and Verma, 2017).
In addition, in a speech to the National Association of Medicaid Directors (NAMD) 2017
Fall Conference, Administrator Verma again mentioned work requirements, emphasizing the
Administration’s inclusion of them as a cornerstone of their Medicaid policy. She said, in part,
“For people living with disabilities, CMS has long believed that meaningful work is essential to
their economic self-sufficiency, self-esteem, wellbeing and improving their health. Why would
we not believe that the same is true for working age, able-bodied Medicaid enrollees? Believing
that community engagement requirements do not support or promote the objectives of Medicaid
is a tragic example of the soft bigotry of low expectations consistently espoused by the prior
administration. Those days are over” (Verma, 2017). This is a clear explanation of policy and
demonstrates the Trump Administration’s reasoning for the support of work requirements for
Medicaid.
CMS has approved the waivers requested by (among others) Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana,
Kentucky, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin. Their waivers share certain similarities.
For example, their waivers all “require certain non-disabled, non-elderly, non-pregnant
individuals to meet work and community engagement requirements as a condition of Medicaid
eligibility” (MACPAC, 2018b). Though they share this adopted policy, the states differ in their
implementation of it by setting different standards for the work requirements. These differences
are found in the groups that are required to participate in these work programs to be eligible for
Medicaid and which individuals within those groups are exempt, in the activities that fulfill the
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work requirements, the required number of hours that must be completed, and in the severity of
the penalties associated with not complying with the requirements (MACPAC, 2018b).
To allow for this flexibility in program administration, CMS provided few guidelines,
most of which are quite vague. For example, one guideline is that “states must automatically
consider individuals in compliance with Medicaid requirements if they are satisfying TANF or
SNAP work requirements” as well as the encouragement of “states to consider allowing a range
of activities to qualify as community engagement, including career planning, volunteering, and
participating in tribal employment programs” (MACPAC, 2018b).
Arkansas received approval from the federal government and began implementation of its
work requirement waiver in June 2018 (Wilson and Thompson, 2018). Monthly enrollment and
other data have been collected since June by the Arkansas Department of Human Services
(Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2019). A preliminary analysis by the Kaiser Family
Foundation found, in part, that a “total of 18,164 individuals have lost coverage since September
2018, due to failing to meet the work and reporting requirements” and also, “78% of those not
exempt (4,776 out of 6,087) did not report 80 hours of qualifying work activities” (Rudowitz et
al., 2019). All data are publicly available; however, Arkansas is the only state of the three with
recorded, actual data at this time. Indiana and New Hampshire have only provided projected
outcomes data.
Kentucky’s work requirement waiver, entitled “Kentucky Helping to Engage and
Achieve Long Term Health” or KY-HEALTH, as previously noted, received approval from the
Trump Administration, a decision that was later struck down by a federal court decision in
Stewart v. Azar. The main argument in Stewart v. Azar was that the approval of the waiver
seemed arbitrary and in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and did not take
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into account its impact on the health coverage of those eligible for Medicaid (Musumeci, 2018).
After minor edits were made to the waiver, the administration approved it a second time (Yetter,
2019). This most recent version of the waiver is used for the analysis in this paper. Also, as noted
in the introduction, it has been challenged again in court, and a decision was handed down on
March 27, 2019 in Charles Gresham, et al v. Alex M. Azar et al. In the ruling, the same Judge
Boasberg once again blocked Kentucky’s work requirements as well as Arkansas’s. He first
examined Arkansas’s original approval by HHS Secretary Azar and found it to be “arbitrary and
capricious” and that Azar failed to “consider adequately” the impact, in the same manner as
Kentucky when he blocked their requirements the first time (Goodnough, 2019). Then, once
again, Kentucky’s work requirements were blocked based on Judge Boasberg’s view that the
changes were so minimal that the new plan “has essentially the same features as it did before”
and that HHS did not consider to the fullest extent “the coverage-loss consequences”
(Goodnough, 2019).
The concept of administrative burden, as briefly noted above, is further explained by
Moynihan, Herd, and Harvey as what shapes citizens’ experience of the interactions they have
with their government, including whether they can successfully access services provided to them
by the government as well as be treated fairly and respectfully (Moynihan et. al, 2015). Further,
it “alters the unit of analysis in citizen-state interactions” and the degree of severity of such
burdens corresponds to how much this unit of analysis in these interactions is altered (Moynihan
et. al, 2015). This directly affects the subject matter of state-imposed Medicaid work
requirements as well as many other government services and their provision.
Lavertu, Lewis, and Moynihan also discussed the concept and theory of administrative
burden in government, particularly how it was coupled with the administration of George W.
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Bush’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) (Lavertu et al., 2013). Although the subjects
were government employees instead of the Medicaid population, they were the ones affected by
the government administrative burden in this scenario, in having to follow the new government
requirements to assess their own programs in whatever ways the Office of Management and
Budget, that managed the Bush Administration’s PART system, asked of them. Further, Lavertu,
Lewis, and Moynihan found that the managers surveyed in “agencies associated with liberal
programs and employees (“liberal agencies”) agreed to a greater extent than those in agencies
associated with conservative programs and employees (“conservative agencies”) that PART
required significant agency time and effort and that it imposed a burden on management
resources” (Lavertu et al., 2013). They focused on “Clinton and Lewis’s measure of agency
ideology” in order to define which agencies were “liberal” versus those that were “conservative,”
which essentially was based on survey data collected by those in academia, think tanks, and
media outlets that deal with the federal government. They also combined this with “the
percentage of agency career managers that self-identified as Democrats (including independents
who lean Democratic); the average respondent ideology (reported on a seven-point scale from
“very conservative” to “very liberal”); and the average respondent ideal point based on how
respondents themselves would have voted on bills in Congress” (Lavertu et al., 2013).
It is also important to note that Lavertu et al. found objective differences between federal
agencies when it came to quantity and severity of burdens that PART imposed. They found that
“liberal agencies were required to evaluate more programs and implement more improvement
plans relative to their organizational capacity” (Lavertu et al., 2013). This further supports the
idea of political motivation behind the costs imposed as administrative burden at many junctures
within the government.
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Heinrich (2018) studied the effect of immigration policy in the United States, and how
administrative burden occurs, in part, in the form of the unclear law resulting from
“compromises and tradeoffs” at the federal level that leave a large part of implementation and
enforcement of these laws and policies up to state and local governments’ discretion.
Specifically, she studied a policy in Texas that denied some children born to Mexican
immigrants, who were citizens, access to their birth certificates, and interviewed parents and
analyzed survey data of children affected by this policy (Heinrich, 2018). The purpose of this
was to show what outcomes from her study could also apply to other policies related to
immigration that hinder immigrants’ access to government assistance and benefits and ultimately
“impose barriers to their integration into society” through this administrative burden (Heinrich,
2018). She found “serious, adverse consequences” for these children, reiterating that this was
largely due to the administrative burden imposed in the enforcement and the lack of transparency
and fairness of the laws at the state and local levels (Heinrich, 2018). She concludes by calling
on those in the fields of public administration and political science to further study administrative
burden, and points out that her findings are just one example of how discretion during the
implementation process “can diminish the transparent and effective execution” of such policies,
“as well as our commitment to equality of opportunity under the law” (Heinrich, 2018).
Finally, Moynihan, Herd, and Ribgy, in their 2013 analysis of the administrative burden
of Medicaid procedures in all 50 states, present the most comprehensive model, providing a
useful context for this analysis. They studied several aspects of each of the Medicaid applications
and procedures for all states, and found that in states with Medicaid applications that had fewer
questions, required lower expense reporting burden, and did not require an interview, the rates of
take-up for Medicaid were higher (Moynihan et al., 2013). In addition, they concluded by
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revealing a political aspect of administrative burden: in states where Democrats were in power,
applicants were less likely to face a high administrative burden (Moynihan et al., 2013). The
authors conclude by stressing the importance of future studies of administrative burden using the
type of measures they used. They note that studies largely examine legislation but rarely
administrative rules that are also a form of policy, and often, burden (Moynihan et al., 2013).
Therefore, regarding the many current Medicaid recipients and their struggle with
maintaining benefits when work or community engagement requirements are put in place, these
programs are likely to impose an administrative burden on these recipients. Moynihan, Herd, and
Harvey add to the theory of administrative burden by delineating three distinct types: learning
costs, psychological costs, and compliance costs (Moynihan et al., 2015). Learning costs “arise
from engaging in search processes to collect information about public services, and assessing
how they are relevant to the individual” (Moynihan et al., 2015). Psychological costs “include
the stigma of applying for or participating in a program with negative perceptions, a sense of loss
of power or autonomy in interactions with the state, or the stresses of dealing with administrative
processes” (Moynihan et al., 2015). Compliance costs “are the burdens of following
administrative rules and requirements” which could be “costs of completing forms, or providing
documentation of status” or in the business world, the many costs associated with compliance
with government regulations (Moynihan et al., 2015). This is the main theoretical lens through
which I conduct my research, and that I use for my classification and comparison of the work
requirements in both Arkansas and Kentucky.
This literature leads to the aim of this paper, which will be to examine the effects of
Medicaid work requirement implementation and its associated administrative burdens on
enrollment in Arkansas’s federally approved expansion program. In a second step, I will be able
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to estimate the impact the administration of work requirements in Kentucky would have, for all
aspects of the program this state shares with Arkansas. Arkansas was chosen because it was the
first state to implement these work requirements and at present the only state with data after
implementation available to the public. Based on the literature reviewed, my hypothesis is that
with a greater administrative burden, more eligible people will forgo a benefit, and, more
specifically, in this case, more people that are eligible for Medicaid will forgo Medicaid due to
the administrative burdens associated with work requirements. Arkansas’s trend is expected to be
similar in Kentucky once it implements its own work requirements, especially if the two states
have a similar amount and level of severity of these burdens within the proposals for their work
requirements in each of their waivers.

Research Design
To begin, it is important to contextualize both Arkansas and Kentucky and the similarities
that led them to impose these work requirements in the first place. Therefore, I briefly address
any similarities between the two states’ governments’ structure and the political parties in power
in the governorship, house, and senate at the time that they submitted these waivers. This will
give initial insight to and lay important groundwork for the rest of the research of this paper.
This information will also help strengthen the internal validity of the study, as comparing
two different states on an issue such as this can prove to be problematic if the proper factors are
not taken into consideration and controlled for. The similarities between the two work
requirement waivers in Arkansas and Kentucky are the basis of this analysis, but to examine
whether there was a decrease in enrollment in Arkansas that can be attributed to the work
requirements, I will use West Virginia as the control case for Arkansas. The two states are

17
regionally close, and upon initial viewing of the enrollment trend, West Virginia follows a
broadly similar trajectory as pre-treatment Arkansas. West Virginia has not pursued work
requirements at this time.
Total enrollment data for Arkansas, Kentucky, and West Virginia can be found via
Medicaid.gov, and specifically, the page entitled “Monthly Medicaid & CHIP Application,
Eligibility Determination, and Enrollment Reports & Data” (Medicaid.gov, 2019). This raw data
can be downloaded and is available for public use. This data will be used to show the trends of
Arkansas, Kentucky, and West Virginia’s total Medicaid enrollment for the months before and
after June 2018, or, the month in which Arkansas began implementation of their work
requirements.
I will estimate the effect of this policy change by looking at the difference between the
change in enrollment in Arkansas and the change in enrollment in West Virginia, over the same
time period (encompassing the policy change in Arkansas, but not West Virginia). I will then use
the difference of change in enrollment for both of these states as an estimate of the effect of the
work requirements on Arkansas’s Medicaid enrollment, net of other trends. This estimate will in
turn serve to estimate enrollment changes in Kentucky if the work requirements are approved.
Figure 1 shows each state’s Medicaid enrollment over time, and Figure 2 shows enrollment as a
percentage of each state’s population, to allow for comparability.
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Figure 1: Total Medicaid Enrollment in Arkansas, Kentucky, and West Virginia
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Figure 2: Percent of Medicaid Enrollees in Each State Based on Yearly Population in
Arkansas, Kentucky, and West Virginia

The changes in the trend lines in Figure 2 look more dramatic than those of Figure 1, and
this is due to the changes in population.1 Also, it is important to note that each month out of the
year uses the same population, the census annual estimate. Therefore, there is a change in
population only from December 2017 to January 2018, in which Arkansas’s estimate increased
by 10,828 and West Virginia’s estimate actually decreased by 11,216.

1

In this same vein, it could also be important to compare the slopes of these trends. The slope (or the average
month-to-month change) of the pre-treatment trend for Arkansas is (-0.020)/17 months = -0.001, or -0.1%. The
slope of the post-treatment trend for Arkansas is (-0.019)/7 months = -0.003, or -0.3%. The slope of the pretreatment trend for West Virginia is 0.010/17 months = -0.0006, or -0.06%. The slope of the post-treatment trend for
West Virginia is (-0.006)/7 = -0.0008, or -0.08%.
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Moynihan, Herd, and Ribgy created their own method to code the administrative burden
of Medicaid procedures in all 50 states, which included looking at the application for Medicaid,
and also the enrollment process overall in 2013. These coding categories included: length of
application (“How long (measured in number of words) is the state Medicaid application?”),
number of questions on the application, the income reporting burden (“Do individuals have to
report income sources in the application process? Do they have to document income sources?
How many different types of income have to be specified?”), the expense reporting burden (“Do
individuals have to report expenses in the application process? Do they have to document
expenses? How many different types of expenses have to be specified?”), whether or not
individuals have to provide documentation proving their residency in the state, whether or not
the enrollment process requires “an in-person interview to qualify for the program,” and whether
or not an applicant has “to renew their status every 6 months as opposed to every year”
(Moynihan et al., 2013). They then compared this (now quantitative) data on the burden scores
using a series of OLS regressions “on measures of state economic/fiscal and political context”
(Moynihan et al., 2013).
This analysis draws on some of the same concepts used by Moynihan, Herd, and Rigby
for coding the administrative burden imposed on Medicaid recipients in Arkansas and Kentucky.
I will analyze both waivers and sort data into the following categories: age requirement, hour
requirement for work or community service activities in order to remain eligible for Medicaid
benefits, the standard(s) for being above and below the federal poverty line and still receiving
Medicaid benefits, the reporting methods allowed or provided, reasons for disenrollment, the
types of activities that are allowed to complete the requirement, the ways in which people are
allowed to reapply after loss of eligibility (if any), premium or copayment or cost-sharing
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specifications and requirements, whether or not the state will still provide non-emergency
medical transportation, and all of the exemptions for these aforementioned requirements or
burdens. This can be found in more detail in the Analysis and Findings section.
These are compared side by side and each state’s requirements are included in the
analysis for comparison. I hypothesize that enough of these categories of administrative burden
are similar enough to show that Kentucky’s total enrollment will follow a similar trajectory in
Medicaid enrollment as Arkansas over time. Therefore, monthly Medicaid enrollment in each
state is the primary unit of analysis in this paper. The data are then analyzed to see if there is an
overall shift leading to a decrease, using a difference-in-differences estimator.
Following this analysis, the goal is to be able to provide data that could give a sense of
the future effect that work and community engagement requirements could have on the state of
Kentucky once they are implemented, and whether it will follow a similar trend.

Background
The structures of the state governments of Arkansas and Kentucky are quite similar,
especially in recent years. In both states, the Republican party has control of the governorship as
well as both houses of the state legislature, or what is commonly called a “trifecta.” Arkansas’s
current Republican governor, Asa Hutchinson, has been governor since he was elected in 2015
and was preceded by a Democrat, Mike Beebe. A Republican majority has controlled both the
Arkansas House of Representatives and state Senate since 2012, and the number of Republican
representatives has grown after each election since 2012 as well. In Kentucky, Republican
Governor Matt Bevin has been governor since 2015. He was preceded by Steve Beshear, a
Democrat. A Republican majority has controlled the state Senate since 2014, but the House of
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Representatives has only had a Republican majority since 2016. That is to say, Kentucky’s
“trifecta” has only been in effect since 2016. A Republican trifecta also currently exists in West
Virginia; however, this has not been the case for long. The current governor, Jim Justice, was
elected and assumed office as a Democrat, but shortly after announced that he was switching to
the Republican Party, and now holds office as a Republican governor. The West Virginia
legislature consists of the West Virginia House of Delegates and the West Virginia Senate. Both
the house and senate have been under Republican control since 2014.

Analysis and Findings
I began my data collection by finding both states’ CMS-approved Section 1115 waivers
and reading through each of them. As I read through them, any requirement or exemption listed
was copied and pasted into a document of my own in order to keep track of all of them. Each
requirement and exemption was then compared side by side to its counterpart in the other state
and those that were similar, or exactly the same, were identified as such. Then, those that clearly
would impose some sort of burden; psychological costs, compliance costs, or learning costs on
Medicaid recipients were selected and eventually included in the table viewable in the Appendix.
This table includes the relevant work requirements and exemptions coded directly from both
Arkansas and Kentucky’s 1115 waivers. This analysis did draw on the coding categories for
administrative burden by Moynihan, Herd, and Ribgy (2013), and additional categories:
Exemptions (for Work Requirements in General), General Reporting Requirements, and
Requirement of Hours to Remain Eligible.
I also included in the table my own 1-5 scoring scale, 1 being least severe and 5 being the
most, as to what I considered to be the severity of burden for each requirement and exemption in
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both Arkansas and Kentucky’s 1115 waivers explaining their work requirement plans. I included
the exemptions to these rules that each state listed as well, in order to give a fuller picture of the
burden that is or will be imposed on citizens. It is important to note that I rated exemptions that
seemed less stringent (in other words, that they exempt more people and more groups)
consistently lower on the same scoring scale because I view a higher amount of people exempted
as a lower burden on the state’s Medicaid eligible population as a whole. Below is a simplified
version of overall scores. A more detailed version of this table in the Appendix, and includes the
scores for each category, total scores, and total possible score for each of the states’ waivers.
Requirement/Exemptions
Age Requirement
Federal Poverty Line (FPL) Standard
Exemptions (for Work Requirements in General)
General Reporting Requirements
Requirement of Hours to Remain Eligible
Types of Allowed Activities to Complete Requirement
How to Retry/Reenter/ Reapply After Loss of Eligibility
Premium/Copayment
Premium/copayment exemptions
Waiver of the Requirement to Provide Non-Emergency Medical
Transportation (NEMT)
Reasons for Disenrollment
Retroactive Eligibility
TOTAL SCORES:
TOTAL POSSIBLE POINTS:

Kentucky
HEALTH
Score
3
4
3
2
4
3
2
4
3

Arkansas
Works
Score
3
4
2
4
4
2
5
4
2

3
4
2
37
60

1
2
3
36
60

Kentucky’s administrative burden, according to my scoring mechanism, scored an almost
negligible one point higher than Arkansas, and therefore I think we can expect similar results in a
likely drop in enrollment as the Arkansas decrease and therefore, the estimate for Kentucky
should be quite similar to the one done in this analysis. This one point is a difference and will be
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taken into account in my analysis, but it is not practically significant, as Arkansas’s score is
97.3% of Kentucky’s, and could be the result of error when assigning scores based on the
severity of the requirements and the amount of burden they imply. These categories of
administrative burden are similar between the two states and show that Kentucky’s total
enrollment will likely follow a similar trajectory as Arkansas’s in Medicaid enrollment over
time. Arkansas can then be used as a basis for making a projection for Kentucky. It is important
to note that it is possible that some burdens are more important than others, and this could affect
the analysis. If the difference is greater in one of the more “important” categories, or in other
words, a category that is more likely than others to lead a Medicaid recipient to lose or withdraw
from coverage, this could mean that there is a larger difference overall between the two states’
Medicaid work requirements, and therefore a study in which the two states’ enrollment would be
less comparable when explaining a trend in Medicaid enrollment.
Scoring is in relation to the other state’s requirements. For example, in the “Reasons for
Disenrollment” category, Kentucky’s waiver listed the following: Failure to make required
premium contributions within sixty (60) days of the date of invoice, failure to provide the
necessary information for the state to complete an annual redetermination, and failure to timely
and accurately report a change in circumstance affecting eligibility only in such circumstances
where a beneficiary would no longer be eligible for Medicaid. Arkansas listed the following:
Determined to be medically frail after they were previously determined eligible and failure to
report compliance for 3 months (state will dis-enroll the beneficiary for the remainder of the
calendar year). I rated Kentucky a 4 and Arkansas a 2 on this category for three reasons. First,
Kentucky offers less of a grace period for their premiums that Arkansas offers for their
compliance reporting (60 versus 90 days). Also, the vague language presents a burden in and of
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itself; “timely and accurately” should definitely be more specific – especially since it is regarding
reasons for total disenrollment from the program and benefits. Finally, Arkansas includes
“determined to be medically frail” after already determined eligible, whereas Kentucky chooses
to use the phrasing “change in circumstance affecting eligibility only in such circumstances
where a beneficiary would no longer be eligible for Medicaid.” This encompasses medical frailty
– and many other possible changes. Therefore, Kentucky’s administrative burden is deemed to
be this much higher than Arkansas’s regarding this category.
An example of coding exemptions rather than requirements is in the category
“Premium/copayment exemptions.”
Kentucky included the following groups as exempt:
•
•
•
•
•

Pregnant women
Survivors of domestic violence
Former foster care youth
Beneficiaries who are eligible for transitional medical assistance as described in sections
1925 and 193 I (cX2) of the Act
Those determined medically frail

Arkansas, on the other hand, included the following:
•
•
•
•
•

Individuals ages 1 and older and under age 18 and infants under age 1 whose income is
under 150 percent FPL (for premiums) or 133 percent FPL (for cost sharing)
Children for whom child welfare services are made available under Part B of title IV of
the Act on the basis of being a child in foster care and individuals receiving benefits
under Part E of that title, without regard to age
At state option, individuals under age 19, 20 or age 21, eligible under § 435.222 of this
chapter
Disabled children, except as provided at § 447.55(a)(4) (premiums), who are receiving
medical assistance by virtue of the application of the Family Opportunity Act in
accordance with sections 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XIX) and 1902(cc) of the Act
Pregnant women, except for premiums allowed under § 447.55(a)(1) and cost sharing
for services specified in the state plan as not pregnancy-related, during the pregnancy
and through the postpartum period which begins on the last day of pregnancy and
extends through the end of the month in which the 60-day period following termination
of pregnancy ends
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•
•
•

•

Any individual whose medical assistance for services furnished in an institution, or at
state option in a home and community-based setting, is reduced by amounts reflecting
available income other than required for personal needs
An individual receiving hospice care, as defined in section 1905(o) of the Act
An Indian who is eligible to receive or has received an item or service furnished by an
Indian health care provider or through referral under contract health services is exempt
from premiums. Indians who are currently receiving or have ever received an item or
service furnished by an Indian health care provider or through referral under contract
health services are exempt from all cost sharing
Individuals who are receiving Medicaid because of the state's election to extend
coverage as authorized by § 435.213 of this chapter (Breast and Cervical Cancer).

While there are a larger number of groups in Arkansas, I viewed many of these groups as being
accounted for in Kentucky as well in more general terms. However, there were also several that
were not, so it was largely due to the fact that Arkansas exempts more groups that I rated
Kentucky a 3 and Arkansas a 2. The number is lower here, again, because more exemptions
surely mean a lower burden as more people do not have to provide work or community
engagement hours in order to receive Medicaid. This method may not work as well in a future
study if it were to compare all fifty states, and would probably benefit from using more objective
methodology such as Moynihan et al.’s, described previously.
I collected, cleaned, and sorted total enrollment data for Arkansas, Kentucky, and West
Virginia, found via Medicaid.gov, “Monthly Medicaid & CHIP Application, Eligibility
Determination, and Enrollment Reports & Data” (Medicaid.gov). To determine the previous
trend of enrollment before June 2018 (to reiterate – the month of the beginning of
implementation of Arkansas’s work requirements), I collected data for Arkansas, Kentucky, and
West Virginia starting in January 2017. The analysis starts here, and not earlier, for two reasons:
enrollment is not on a consistent trend before 2017, and in January 2017 the Trump
Administration took office, which changed the political environment. This data ends in
December 2018, as this is the most recent month that data could be found for all three states.
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Using this monthly enrollment data, I standardized by calculating the change in
enrollment from month to month in all three states. Using this data, I estimated the difference-indifferences of the percent of those enrolled divided by the state’s annual population between
West Virginia, my control state, and Arkansas, my treatment state. Below are my findings:
Table 1: Difference-in-Differences Estimation of Percentage of Medicaid Enrollment Per
State Annual Population
Average PreJune 2018
Medicaid
Enrollment

Standard
Error

Average PostJune 2018
Medicaid
Enrollment

Standard
Error

Difference
between Preand Post-June
2018 Average
Enrollment

Standard
Error

Arkansas

30.21%

0.12%

28.85%

0.25%

-1.36%

0.26%

West Virginia

30.67%

0.09%

29.85%

0.12%

-0.81%

0.16%

0.45%

0.15%

1.00%

0.27%

-0.54%

0.30%

Difference
between
Arkansas and
West Virginia

In Table 1, 30.21%, 28.85%, 30.67%, and 29.85% represent the proportions of average Medicaid
populations over the respective months for their respective states. In other words, each of these is
the average of each month’s total Medicaid enrollment divided by the total population for that
year. -1.36% is the difference in enrollment between the average pre- and post-June 2018
Medicaid enrollment in Arkansas, meaning that there is a decrease of 1.36 percent on average of
total Medicaid enrollment in Arkansas between the two periods. -0.81% is the difference in
enrollment between the average pre- and post-June 2018 change in Medicaid enrollment in West
Virginia, meaning that there is a decrease of 0.81 percent on average of total Medicaid
enrollment in West Virginia between the two periods. The difference between Arkansas and
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West Virginia shows that there is a slightly larger decrease on average in Arkansas in relation to
West Virginia: about 0.54 percent.
The decrease in total enrollment between the pre-treatment period (12 months of 2017
and 6 months of 2018, so 2/3 of the time is in 2017 and 1/3 in 2018) and post-treatment period (6
months of 2018) can be calculated by multiplying 30.21% by 2/3 of 3,002,997 times 1/3 of
3,013,825, and subtract from this figure 28.85% multiplied by 3,013,825.2 The value of this
calculation is 41,931. This is the gross drop in enrollment, and to find the percentage of this that
was due to work requirements, 54 (from 0.54 percent) divided by 136 (from -1.36 percent), or
0.397. Just under 40% lost enrollment due to the work requirements according to this analysis, or
16,649 people. This can be visualized using Figure 2.
This estimation is different than the actual drop in enrollment according to the percentage
change in population, which is a decrease of 49,937, as opposed to the estimation of 41,931. This
figure multiplied that same percentage, 0.397, is 19,828 as opposed to the estimation of 16,649.
This many people were disenrolled due to work requirements. The difference between these two
numbers shows that there is some distortion introduced by my analysis, but I had to standardize
to compare two states with different population sizes. This can be visualized in Figure 1.
West Virginia did not have a treatment (implementation of a Medicaid work requirement
program) during the entire period of study and Arkansas did, during the months studied of June
2018 to December 2018. Therefore, this first step of this analysis shows that while Arkansas has
more of a decrease post treatment in Medicaid enrollment than West Virginia, it is likely due to
other factors. It is also important to acknowledge that the key assumption of parallel trends is not

2

The equation described above is: 0.3021 * (((2/3) * 3,002,997) + ((1/3) * 3,013,825))) - ((0.2885) * 3,013,825
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truly accurate for the pre-treatment time period, or, in other words, these trends are not truly
parallel.
Having estimated the decrease in enrollment as a result of work requirements net of
existing trends in Arkansas, I am now applying this to Kentucky’s enrollment numbers in order
to estimate how many fewer people will be disenrolled if and when Kentucky implements their
work requirements.
In Table 2 below, 27.54% is the average percentage of those enrolled in Medicaid per the
total annual population in Kentucky from July 2018 to December 2018, or the same time period
as the entire post-treatment period for Arkansas. It is important to note again that Kentucky has
not implemented its work requirements yet, and therefore did not during this time. 27%
represents the estimated percentage of those enrolled in Medicaid per the total annual population
in Kentucky if work requirements were to be implemented.
In other words, this shows that if Kentucky ever implements work requirements, the
change due to work requirements alone will only be about a 0.54 of a percent decrease, the same
as the estimated effect in Arkansas. Multiplying 27.54% by the estimated population in 2018 in
Kentucky, 4,468,402, and then subtracting 0.54% from 27.54%, multiplying this by the
population, and subtracting the first number from the second, the number of enrollees that would
be disenrolled during this period in Kentucky due to the administrative burden of work
requirements is about 24,129 people, over and above the existing trend.3
This estimation of Kentucky with work requirements is based on the difference-indifferences estimation between Arkansas and West Virginia subtracted from the change in

3

The equation described above is (0.275 * 4,468,402) - ((0.275-0.0054) * 4,468,402)
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average Medicaid enrollment of the total annual population in Kentucky from June 2018 to
December 2018.

Table 2: Estimation of Percentage of Medicaid Enrollees for Kentucky Based on June 2018
to December 2018 Data
Estimation of Kentucky With
Work Requirements (PostImplementation)
Kentucky With No Work
Requirements
Difference

27.00%

1,206,469

27.54%

1,230,598

-0.54%

-24,129

These findings are congruent to an extent with other similar studies that have already
been done on enrollment declines in Arkansas. For example, an NPR report in February
indicated that of the 62,000 recipients subject to the work requirements upon implementation,
18,000 had been disenrolled by December 2018 (Froelich, 2019). My estimate in Arkansas is
about 16,245 disenrolled due to work requirements by December 2018. The NPR study did not
use West Virginia as a control state so that could be one reason our numbers do not entirely
agree. However, both my analysis and the NPR study agree to an extent that Medicaid
enrollment has been declining in Arkansas, and the findings of my study stop short at being able
to confidently say that the work requirements are responsible for this decline in enrollment.

Limitations
Limitations to this analysis include, first and foremost, the fact that, in studying West
Virginia and Arkansas, I was analyzing two states that were already decreasing in enrollment
before the work requirements in Arkansas even came into being. The ideal study would have a
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flat, or even increasing, and more importantly, parallel, trend between the two states before the
treatment in order to truly assess work requirements as the causal factor in this decrease in
enrollment. However, in this study there is no way to tell for certain how much of that decrease
is due to the administrative burden of work requirements.
Another limitation is external validity. The focus on the similar aspects of the two
waivers will at least provide some external validity for applicability not only to Kentucky, but
other similar states that receive approval for implementation of work requirements, but there are
still many reasons why this analysis would not translate externally to other states if more
Medicaid work requirements go forward and are implemented. Also, West Virginia is an
imperfect control state but the use of a control state was important to the internal validity of this
analysis. Internal validity also is a concern, however, because the demographic makeup is not
taken into account for either state, including things like the age, race, and sex of the Medicaid
enrollees studied. Hopefully, this research on recent occurrences and data will push forward
healthcare policy research in this field, and provide an objective analysis of what happens when
these work requirements are implemented, and considered when choosing to implement such
policies in the future.
In addition, the post-treatment period for Arkansas’s implementation was not as sufficient
as I would have hoped, in order to have an analysis with more data points to show a more
compelling picture of what the trend post-treatment would be. Future studies on this topic should
and probably will have more post-treatment data to work with, again, if more work requirements
for Medicaid are legally allowed to be implemented in the future.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, this analysis provides an estimation of what could happen to total
Medicaid enrollment in Kentucky and possibly other states if work and community engagement
requirements are implemented. Using Arkansas’s trend of decreasing enrollment numbers since
they implemented their work requirements, I found an almost negligible net effect of work
requirements alone on Medicaid enrollment in Arkansas, and estimated and predicted the same in
Kentucky. Future studies on this subject matter will hopefully have more data available in order
to construct a more valid study of the actual effect of work requirements in states that have
implemented them in comparison with those that have not and do not plan to – in order to inform
the states that plan to what will happen to their Medicaid enrollment. Future studies that ask this
same or a similar research question should also take into account other factors affecting
Medicaid enrollment to provide a better basis for their estimation in order to predict their effect
on the state(s) in question, and explain the effect of other factors leading to disenrollment. While
this issue is politically charged, future studies should focus on analyzing the objective results of
these programs in order to inform policy on both sides of the aisle.
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Appendix
Requirement/
Exemptions

Kentucky HEALTH

Score

Arkansas Works

Score

Age
Requirement

Adult beneficiaries ages 19
through 64

3

Adults beneficiaries ages 19
through 64

3

Federal Poverty
Line (FPL)
Standard

Adults up to and including
133 percent of the FPL who
meet the other criteria
specified

4

Adults up to and including
133 percent of the FPL who
meet the criteria specified

4

3

•

2

Exemptions (for •
Work
Requirements •
in General)
•
•

•
•

•

Former foster care
youth
Pregnant women
Survivors of domestic
violence
Primary caregivers of a
dependent (limited to
one caregiver per
household)
Beneficiaries considered
medically frail
Beneficiaries diagnosed
with an acute medical
condition that would
prevent them from
complying with the
requirements
Full time students

•
•
•

•

•
•

4

Beneficiaries identified
as medically frail4
Those who are pregnant
or 60 days post-partum
Full time students
Beneficiary is exempt
from Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP)
community engagement
requirements
Beneficiary is exempt
from Transitional
Employment Assistance
(TEA) Cash Assistance
community engagement
requirements
Beneficiary receives
TEA Cash Assistance
Beneficiary is
incapacitated in the

What it means to be “medically frail” is not clearly defined in either state waiver, but I use for the working
definition for both states the definition in Kentucky’s FAQ on their website about their work requirement waiver:
Beneficiaries may be considered medically frail for many different reasons. Some of those reasons include:
Disabling mental health diagnosis, chronic substance use disorder, serious and complex medical condition,
significant impairment in ability to perform activities of daily living, diagnosed with HIV/AIDs, eligible for Social
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), chronic homelessness, or a survivor of domestic violence
https://kentuckyhealth.ky.gov/Pages/FAQ.aspx/
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•
•

•
•

General
Reporting
Requirements

Monthly; methods allowed
not listed

Requirement of
Hours to
Remain Eligible
Types of
Allowed
Activities to
Complete
Requirement

Non-exempt beneficiaries
must complete and report
80 hours per month
•
•
•
•
•

Employment
Education
Job skills training
Job search activities
Community service

Monthly; allows
beneficiaries to report
monthly their community
engagement qualifying
activities or exemptions
using ONLY an online
portal

2

4

3

short-term, medically
certified as physically
or mentally unfit for
employment, or has an
acute medical condition
validated by a medical
professional that would
prevent him or her from
complying with the
requirements
Beneficiary is caring for
an incapacitated person
Beneficiary lives in a
home with his or her
minor dependent child
age 17 or younger
Beneficiary is receiving
unemployment benefits
Beneficiary is currently
participating in a
treatment program for
alcoholism or drug
addiction

Must complete at least 80
hours per calendar month of
one, or any combination, of
the qualifying activities
•
•
•
•

Employment
Education
Community service
Self-employment, or
having an income that is
consistent with being
employed or selfemployed at least 80
hours per month

4

4

2
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•

•
•
•

•
•

•

•

How to
Retry/Reenter/
Reapply After
Loss of
Eligibility

Able to reactivate eligibility
on the first day of the
month after completing 80
hours of community
engagement in a 30-day
period or a state-approved
health literacy or financial
literacy course […] The
option to take a course to
re-enter from suspension is
available one time per 12month benefit period.

2

Enrollment in an
educational program,
including high school,
higher education, or
GED classes
Participation in on-thejob training
Participation in
vocational training
Participation in
independent job search
(up to 40 hours per
month)
Participation in job
search training (up to 40
hours per month)
Participation in a class
on health insurance
using the health system,
or healthy living (up to
20 hours per year)
Participation in
activities or programs
available through the
Arkansas Department of
Workforce Services,
Participation in and
compliance with
SNAP/Transitional
Employment Assistance
(TEA) employment
initiative programs

If the beneficiaries are
noncompliant with the
community engagement
requirements or reporting
requirements for any three
months, eligibility will be
terminated until the next
plan year, when they must
file a new application to
receive an eligibility
determination. At this time,
previous noncompliance

5
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with the community
engagement requirement
will not be factored into the
state’s determination of
their eligibility
Premium of not less than
one dollar per month and
not to exceed 4 percent of
household income

Premium/
Copayment

4

a. Individuals with income
above 100 percent of the
FPL who are required to
pay premiums and who do
not make an initial premium
payment will not be
enrolled in Kentucky
HEALTH and will be
required to reapply should
they wish to participate.

•
•
•
•

Pregnant women
Survivors of domestic
violence
Former foster care
youth
Beneficiaries who are
eligible for transitional
medical assistance as

4

Beneficiaries above 100
percent of the FPL will be
required to pay monthly
premiums of up to 2 percent
of household income.
Premiums and cost-sharing
will be subject to an
aggregate cap of no more
than 5
percent of family monthly
or quarterly income.

b. Individuals at or below
100 percent of the FPL who
are required to pay
premiums and who do not
make an initial premium
payment will be enrolled in
Kentucky HEALTH
effective the first day of the
month in which the sixty
(60) day payment period
expired; however, once
enrolled, these beneficiaries
will be subject to the
requirements and conditions
if the general requirements
Premium/
copayment
exemptions

Monthly premiums from
beneficiaries with incomes
above 100 and up to and
including 133 percent of the
federal poverty
level (FPL)

3

Exemptions from costsharing set forth in 42 CFR
Section 447.56(a):
•

Individuals ages 1 and
older and under age 18
and infants under age 1
whose income is under

2
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•

described in sections
1925 and 193 I (cX2) of
the Act
Those determined
medically frail

•

•

•

•

150 percent FPL (for
premiums) or 133
percent FPL (for cost
sharing)
Children for whom
child welfare services
are made available
under Part B of title IV
of the Act on the basis
of being a child in foster
care and individuals
receiving benefits under
Part E of that title,
without regard to age
At state option,
individuals under age
19, 20 or age 21,
eligible under § 435.222
of this chapter
Disabled children,
except as provided at §
447.55(a)(4)
(premiums), who are
receiving medical
assistance by virtue of
the application of the
Family Opportunity Act
in accordance with
sections
1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XIX)
and 1902(cc) of the Act
Pregnant women,
except for premiums
allowed under §
447.55(a)(1) and cost
sharing for services
specified in the state
plan as not pregnancyrelated, during the
pregnancy and through
the postpartum period
which begins on the last
day of pregnancy and
extends through the end
of the month in which
the 60-day period
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•

•

•

•

following termination
of pregnancy ends
Any individual whose
medical assistance for
services furnished in an
institution, or at state
option in a home and
community-based
setting, is reduced by
amounts reflecting
available income other
than required for
personal needs
An individual receiving
hospice care, as defined
in section 1905(o) of
the Act
An Indian who is
eligible to receive or has
received an item or
service furnished by an
Indian health care
provider or through
referral under contract
health services is
exempt from premiums.
Indians who are
currently receiving or
have ever received an
item or service
furnished by an Indian
health care provider or
through referral under
contract health services
are exempt from all cost
sharing
Individuals who are
receiving Medicaid
because of the state's
election to extend
coverage as authorized
by § 435.213 of this
chapter (Breast and
Cervical Cancer).
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Waiver of the
Requirement to
Provide NonEmergency
Medical
Transportation
(NEMT)

State does waive
this requirement as
applicable to them. They do
not have to provide nonemergency medical
transportation (NEMT) for
beneficiaries enrolled in the
new adult group, with
exceptions for beneficiaries
who are:
•
•

•
•
•

Medically frail
19- or 20-year-old
beneficiaries entitled to
Early and Periodic
Screening or
Diagnostic, and
Treatment (EPSDT)
services
Former foster care
youth
Survivors of domestic
violence
Pregnant women

3

State does not waive
requirement – nonemergency medical
transport services will be
provided through the
State’s
fee-for-service Medicaid
program – and prior
authorization will be
established for the
beneficiary in need of it,
except those served by IHS
or Tribal facilities and
medically frail beneficiaries

1
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Reasons for
Disenrollment

•

4

The state is not obligated to
provide retroactive
eligibility in accordance
with Section 1902(a)(34)
for beneficiaries enrolled in
Kentucky HEALTH, except
for applicants who would
have been eligible in or
after the third month before
the month in which an
application was made, as
either pregnant women or
former foster care youth

2

Kentucky HEALTH

37

Arkansas Works

36

Kentucky HEALTH

60

Arkansas Works

60

•

•

Retroactive
Eligibility

TOTAL
SCORES:
TOTAL
POSSIBLE
POINTS:

•

Failure to make required
premium contributions
within sixty (60) days of
the date of invoice
Failure to provide the
necessary information
for the state to complete
an annual
redetermination
Failure to timely and
accurately report a
change in circumstance
affecting eligibility only
in such circumstances
where a beneficiary
would no longer be
eligible for Medicaid

•

Determined to be
medically frail after
they were previously
determined eligible
Failure to report
compliance for 3
months (state will disenroll the beneficiary
for the remainder of the
calendar year)

The state will provide
coverage effective 30 days
prior to the date of
submitting an application
for coverage for
beneficiaries up to and
including 133 percent
of the FPL

2

3
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